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Abstract
Objectives Meditation practice has recently moved into applied research to improve cognitive functions. However, it is a 
multifaceted practice, with focused attention meditation relying on a sharp focus, and open monitoring meditation relying 
on a diffuse awareness. This study aims to assess the effects of differential alterations of cognition following distinct medita-
tive training and focuses on practitioners’ tendency to fall victim to erroneous automaticity in responding when faced with 
cognitive conflict.
Methods Seventy-three individuals were randomly assigned to one of three intervention groups (internally focused attention 
meditation, externally focused attention meditation, open monitoring meditation) or a wait list control group. The meditation 
groups were trained over the course of 4 weeks and eight sessions. Changes in proneness to erroneous automatic responding 
were tested using two cognitive performance tasks that induce learned or instructed automaticity (Dot Pattern Expectancy 
paradigm, NEXT-paradigm).
Results Overall, meditation training generally improved overcoming learned automaticity (rs = .26–.36, ps = .002–.031) but 
not instructed automaticity compared to the control condition. Furthermore, data suggest open monitoring outperformed 
focused attention in overcoming learned automaticity in one task (rs = .31–.56, ps ≤ .001–.009).
Conclusions Our results provide evidence for meditative training to facilitate practitioners’ ability to select the most appro-
priate course of action against overlearned habits in light of the peculiarities of their current situation. Open monitoring 
meditation is a particularly promising avenue for reducing one’s liability to erroneous habits.
Keywords Cognitive training · Mindfulness · Meditation · Automaticity · Cognitive control
Tremendous effort is needed to change deeply ingrained 
habitual behaviors. Particularly in the rush of everyday 
operations and short deadlines, individuals may be tempted 
to revert to old paradigms and postpone a shift to new and 
improved ones to tomorrow again and again. Being able 
to overcome one’s automatic behaviors and to apply new 
rules in their place is a critical skill. Recently, the processes 
underlying automatic responses have received increased 
attention in cognitive psychology (Moors, 2016). Having 
a prepared behavioral pattern at one’s disposal that gets 
executed in an automatic, reflex-like manner enables quick 
and efficient responses (Meiran et al., 2015). These response 
patterns indicate a high-level preparedness to perform a 
desired action (Logan, 1978), and they can form in a twofold 
manner. Learned automaticity is created through repeated 
execution of a behavior in response to a trigger (Servan-
Schreiber et al., 1996). With increased repetition, the cog-
nitive effort required to decide on a behavior or movement 
and to implement it diminishes, transforming the response 
over time from a deliberate action into an overlearned habit 
(Packard & Goodman, 2013) represented in long-term mem-
ory (Meiran et al., 2015). More recently, another possible 
option to prepare an automated response has been identi-
fied: instructed automaticity (Meiran et al., 2017). This type 
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of automaticity stems from the intention to act being held 
in working memory (Meiran et al., 2012). By keeping the 
instructions on how to deal with an arising task or chal-
lenge in mind, one can execute the appropriate behavior 
rapidly without having to have learned it through repeated 
execution. Many actions in everyday life are characterized 
by routines and repeating processes; they reflect automated 
reflex-like behaviors. Running on autopilot is unavoidable 
and usually beneficial: deliberate action requires more men-
tal effort, which is inherently aversive (Inzlicht et al., 2015; 
Kurzban, 2016). However, the complexity of daily life can 
present individuals with unexpected challenges. When situ-
ations change, new opportunities or demands may prompt 
an adaptation of one’s strategy. Some situations trigger auto-
mated responses that cause individuals to miss better oppor-
tunities or even cause harm. Highly automated behaviors, 
once triggered, prevent individuals from adapting their reac-
tion when a different response would be required (Meiran 
et al., 2012). Although attempts at using cognitive training 
to overcome reflexive responses are numerous, their trans-
ferability to general cognition and performance in natural 
situations is weak (Melby-Lervåg et al., 2016; Sala & Gobet, 
2019). Meditation may be a more promising candidate; dif-
ferent meditation techniques can impact cognition in dif-
ferent ways (Hommel & Colzato, 2017). However, existing 
studies in this field often bear certain limitations in their 
approaches. Some lack a clear delineation of different tech-
niques (e.g., Ainsworth et al., 2013), while others examine 
the effects of only a single short session of meditation (e.g., 
Colzato et al., 2012).
Meditation is a way to cultivate mindfulness and origi-
nates in the Buddhist tradition. Mindfulness was translated 
from the Pāli term sati, which translates to “attentiveness,” 
“awareness,” “memory,” “calling to mind,” or “keeping in 
mind” (Anālayo, 2003; Gethin, 2011). From a cognitive per-
spective, meditation involves the control of attention and 
awareness (e.g., Cahn & Polich, 2009; Holas & Jankowski, 
2013; Isbel & Mahar, 2015) to remain centered on the pre-
sent moment by mentally responding to arising stimuli in 
a specific way (Tang et al., 2007). Today, several models 
attempt to capture the cognitive mechanisms behind mindful 
meditation (e.g., Bishop et al., 2004; Grabovac et al., 2011; 
Holas & Jankowski, 2013; Isbel & Mahar, 2015; Kang et al. 
2013; Shapiro et al., 2006), though the lack of a generally 
accepted definition of mindfulness hampers these attempts. 
For example, some of them emphasize attention-regulation 
processes (e.g., Kang et al., 2013), and others focus more on 
metacognition (e.g., Holas & Jankowski, 2013).
Being mindful requires the practitioner to keep their 
attention on the target of observation and, when the mind 
drifts away, to gently bring their attention back to the origi-
nal target (Kang et al., 2013). Metacognition may play a 
key role in coordinating attentional processes and executive 
functions to sustain a de-centered observation in mindful-
ness meditation (Holas & Jankowski, 2013; Lutz et al., 
2015). In other words, meditation trains one to orchestrate 
the cognitive operations in order to achieve the intended 
state of mindfulness. Recent results strongly support that 
meditation affects the performance of cognitive operations 
and shapes the way individuals deal with cognitive con-
flicts (Chiesa et al., 2011). For example, meditation train-
ing has been shown to alter attentional performance (e.g., 
Sumantry & Stewart, 2021) and executive functions (e.g., 
Gallant, 2016). However, there are also contrary findings 
(e.g., Gallant, 2016); this indicates that more sophisticated 
investigations are required to uncover subtle aspects of atten-
tion control resulting from distinct meditative practices that 
might occur when attention gets challenged by automaticity.
Buddhist scholars recognize two general styles of medita-
tion: samatha, or mental concentration; and vipassanā, or 
insight meditation (Anālayo, 2003). It is said that samatha 
leads to mental calmness, whereas vipassanā is regarded as a 
tool to understand the true nature of one’s mind (Nyanapon-
ika, 1962). Their secular counterparts are called focused 
attention (FA) and open monitoring (OM), respectively 
(Lutz et al., 2008). During FA meditation, one’s attention 
is constantly fixated on an object, either on an internal one 
(e.g., one’s breath) or on an external one (e.g., a candle’s 
flame). In contrast, there is no distinct object to focus on 
during OM meditation. Instead, OM practitioners train 
metacognitive self-awareness: they aim to stay attentive to 
anything that occurs in their experience from moment to 
moment. It involves noticing the occurrence and intensity 
of arising sensations such as emotional tones or intrusive 
thoughts. Both techniques ask practitioners to put specific 
constraints on their mental flow. While meditating, occa-
sional thoughts will inevitably capture the practitioner’s 
attention (Christoff et al., 2016). During FA meditation, 
the arising of a thought or other distraction indicates that 
the meditator has lost control of their attention and should 
re-focus their attention on the intended object. Thus, the 
instructions in FA meditation mainly consist of focusing and 
readjusting. In contrast, during OM meditation, all arising 
impulses should be recognized and observed without inter-
fering with them. Here, a loss of control is indicated by the 
meditator engaging with the arising sensations and expand-
ing them into a “story.” Therefore, before the readjustment, 
OM meditators have to notice the content of their mental 
flow, thereby allowing some timely dynamic in it so that 
the spontaneous thought passes on. The instructions for OM 
consist of observing, noticing, and letting go, providing an 
additional task compared to FA.
Both types of meditation practice should rely on and 
train different cognitive operations (Fox et al., 2016). 
When faced with a conflict caused by either learned or 
instructed automaticity, training a clear awareness of 
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arising action tendencies without engaging in their execu-
tion might result in less erroneous automatic respond-
ing. FA trains concentration toward one salient object 
exclusively. Inversely, when asked to select an appropri-
ate response, OM practice should provide the necessary 
flexibility to restrain the tendency to execute an auto-
mated response more strongly than FA practice, since OM 
emphasizes self-monitoring in a non-judgmental, present-
oriented manner.
This randomized controlled intervention study investi-
gates how different techniques of meditation differentially 
affect individuals’ preparedness to overcome reflexive 
behaviors stemming from both learned and instructed 
automaticity. We hypothesize that meditation practice 
regardless of technique improves overcoming automatic-
ity compared to a control condition and that open moni-
toring practice is more effective for overcoming automa-
ticity than focused attention practice.
Method
Participants
To be able to investigate different techniques of medita-
tion separately, the most promising avenue is recruiting 
meditation-naive subjects and training them in either style 
(Ainsworth et al., 2013). Participants were recruited at an 
informational meeting. Prospective participants got their 
questions answered and were informed about meditation, 
the procedure, and the support by the instructor. It was 
emphasized that it was of great importance to complete 
the entire program (personally and with respect to this 
investigation) and that they would be excluded if they 
missed the group session three times. In total, 8 subjects 
abandoned the study by themselves (OM: 2 females;  FAin: 
2 females, 1 male;  FAex: 2 females, 1 male); none had to 
be excluded for non-compliance. All participants in the 
final sample (N = 73) were meditation-naive individu-
als and employed at the time of the experiment. Four 
groups were formed randomly. Three of them learned a 
different meditation technique each, and the fourth one 
served as a control group: (1) open monitoring (OM) 
with 17 subjects (M = 26.2, SD = 7.9 years), (2) focused 
attention internal (on breathing;  FAin) with 18 subjects 
(M = 24.3, SD = 3.3 years), (3) focused attention exter-
nal (on candle’s flame;  FAex) with 19 subjects (M = 25.5, 
SD = 4.1 years), and (4) a wait list control group with 19 
subjects (M = 24.0, SD = 4.0 years). Sample sizes of com-
parable intervention studies are in a similar range (e.g., 
Ainsworth, et al., 2013; Jensen et al., 2012).
Procedure
In order to ensure a clear separation of FA and OM medi-
tation, an experienced meditation teacher recorded medi-
tation instructions based on the program of S. N. Goenka 
(Hart, 1987). Each session began and ended with a short 
phase of lying down. When carried out before sitting, this 
makes it easier to initiate the self-observation; at the end, 
it prolongs and deepens the practice. The first two intro-
ductory sessions were identical for all groups. From the 
third session onward, the content of the instructions was 
separated; however, the instructions for each session were 
similar in length and structure across groups. All sessions 
were 30 to 35 min long, which exceeds those used in com-
parable investigations (e.g., Ainsworth, et al., 2013; Jensen 
et al., 2012; Morrison et al., 2014). The participants were 
asked to meditate independently at home every day using 
the provided audio files.
In the first two sessions of our intervention  (T1 and  T2), 
the participants were advised to guide their attention toward 
physical sensations in their body in order to introduce them 
to the meditative state. This “scanning” of their bodies was 
combined with gradual movements to help the meditation 
novices find their preferred posture. The first session  (T1) 
was performed entirely while lying down, and the second 
session  (T2) involved a period of sitting, either on the floor 
or a chair, based on personal preference.
From  T3 to  T5, specific aspects of observation were 
introduced successively. For the group practicing  FAin, 
these were different sensations regarding the breath (e.g., 
its softness, regularity, or phases) in the abdominal  (T3) 
and nasal  (T4 and  T5) regions. From  T6 on, the meditators 
were free to choose where to observe the breath. The group 
practicing  FAex was asked to observe various aspects of the 
candle’s flame (e.g., its constancy, brightness, or size). The 
group practicing OM was advised to observe the sensations 
that appeared within their experience without letting them 
become the starting point of a thought or memory. First  (T3), 
practitioners were asked to observe physical stimuli (e.g., 
their points of contact with the floor) and then  (T4) to rec-
ognize the content and quality of each observed stimulus by 
mentally naming or labeling it. This labeling supports non-
evaluation and non-tracking as well as a clearer awareness 
of the demands posed by their practice (see Creswell et al., 
2007). Subsequently  (T5), the observation was extended to 
include arising emotions or thought impulses.
The last three sessions  (T6–T8) within each group were 
identical. The instructions were no longer expanded upon; 
instead, the sessions were designed to repeat and deepen the 
practice. The phases of the teacher’s guidance were greatly 
reduced, in favor of independent continuation by the medi-
tators. Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the eight-




Measures of Learned Automaticity in the Dot Pattern 
Expectancy Paradigm
In the experiment, the dot pattern expectancy paradigm 
(DPX; Jones et al., 2010) was employed to measure over-
coming learned automaticity. This task is a more demand-
ing variation of the AX continuous performance test (AX-
CPT; Servan-Schreiber et  al., 1996). In the AX-CPT, 
participants are shown a cue stimulus followed by a probe 
stimulus. The cue stimulus may be either of the letters A or 
B, while the probe stimulus may be either of the letters X 
or Y. Participants are asked to respond to the probe stimu-
lus: when they have seen an A and then an X, they should 
press the “target” button on a keyboard; but if they have 
seen an A followed by a Y, a B followed by an X, or a B 
followed by a Y, they should press the “non-target” button.
The A–X combination occurs in 70% of the cases, while 
A–Y, B–X, and B–Y make up 10% of the trials each. Thus, 
participants form a habit of pressing the “target” button; it 
becomes an overlearned routine. A tendency to press the 
“target” button even if an A was followed by a Y reflects 
a mechanistic or automatic response: seeing the A–cue 
can trigger the habit to press the “target” button without 
considering the non-target Y–probe. Thus, A–Y errors 
highlight the strength of habitual automaticity and, thus, 
the intensity of the cognitive conflict in overcoming it.
In the DPX-paradigm, each stimulus is an arrangement 
of three to four dots, comparable to braille letters. The DPX 
utilizes one specific dot pattern as the target cue (A–cue), 
one different dot pattern as the target probe (X–probe), 
and a variety of other different patterns as non-target cues 
(B–cues) or non-target probes (Y–probes). These non-target 
cue and probe (B and Y) stimuli are picked randomly from 
an array of five different arrangements each. Like in the 
AX–CPT, participants are instructed to classify only A–X 
sequences as “target” and any other sequence (A–Y, B–X, or 
B–Y) as “non-target.” Likewise, to establish a predominant 
response bias, the DPX consists of 70% A–X sequences, 
whereas the other trial types are represented in only 10% of 
the trials each. Participants were shown a total of 180 cue-
probe sequences. Figure 2 offers a visual representation of 
the DPX-paradigm.
According to signal detection theory (MacMillan & 
Creelman, 1991), sensitivity d-prime (d’) served as a meas-
ure of performance on the task and response conservativ-
ity bias (c-bias) as a measure of response strategy. Correc-
tions for extreme values in hit rates or false alarms were 
applied following the log-linear approach (Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988). To compute d’, the z–transformed rate of 
incorrect positive responses to A–Y trials (false alarms) was 
Fig. 1  Schematic sequence of the meditation intervention: three 
groups  (FAex,  FAin, OM), eight group sessions  (T1–T8). After the 
two introductory sessions, every session, for every group, contains 
five different phases: (1) lying: body scan; (2) sitting: mindful adjust-
ment of one’s sitting posture; (3) sitting: instructions for the respec-
tive meditation technique; (4) sitting: independent continuation of 
the instructions in silence; (5) lying: independent continuation of the 
instructions in silence. Different textures symbolize the proportions 
of different contents of the respective session
Mindfulness 
1 3
subtracted from the z–transformed rate of correct positive 
responses to A–X trials (hits). The initial valid A–cue in 
non-target A–Y trials can trigger the predominant response 
trained by the overrepresentation of A–X trials. An A–Y 
false alarm represents a failure to recognize the subsequent 
invalid Y–probe and, in turn, indicates an erroneous auto-
matic response. Therefore, better results in terms of A–cue 
d’ represent a better propensity to overcome learned auto-
maticity. The c-bias represents the distance between the 
criterion and the point where each response is chosen with 
equal frequency (in standard deviation units). Similar to d’, 
the c-bias was calculated for A–cue sequences by averaging 
the z–transformed false alarm rate and the z–transformed 
hit rate, and then multiplying the result by a negative one. 
As a result, lower values of c-bias indicate a bias toward 
responding negatively (“non-target”) rather than positively 
(“target”).
Measures of Learned and Instructed Automaticity 
in the NEXT‑Paradigm
The NEXT-paradigm was employed as an additional meas-
ure of automaticity (Meiran et al., 2015). First, participants 
received two sets of instructions: one to be implemented 
when red stimuli are presented on the screen, and a different 
one to be implemented when the stimuli are green. Then, 
they were presented with several instances of red stimuli 
to develop a routine in responding. Suddenly, the stimuli 
appeared in green color, which required a different type of 
response. The challenge in responding to green stimuli is 
twofold: (1) to not execute the routinized reaction and (2) 
to keep the new set of instructions for green stimuli in mind 
and respond accordingly.
In total, the NEXT-paradigm consists of 110 blocks of 
choice tasks. Each block begins with instructions for the 
current choice task followed by a “NEXT-phase” and then 
a “GO-phase.” First, the participants were instructed that 
the left key “A” and right key “L” on a computer keyboard 
correspond to two symbols that appeared on the respec-
tive side of the screen. Furthermore, one of those keys was 
declared the NEXT-key. The subsequent NEXT-phase con-
sisted of 0–5 instances of one of the symbols appearing on 
the screen in red color. Participants should react by press-
ing the assigned NEXT-key on a keyboard, regardless of 
whether the stimulus was initially instructed to the left or 
right key. Finally, during the GO-phase, 2 instances of a 
green stimulus appeared on the screen, to which participants 
should react by pressing the respective key that corresponds 
to the symbol as instructed initially. Figure 3 offers a visual 
representation of the NEXT-paradigm.
The instruction at the beginning of each block, which is 
only applicable during the GO-phase, acts as a source of 
conflict during the NEXT-phase. Critically, in some NEXT-
trials, the NEXT-key corresponds to the presented stimulus 
(compatible trials); in others, it does not (incompatible tri-
als). This task comprises two rules that are present at the 
same time and stand in conflict with each other. Depend-
ing on the color of the stimuli, the participant has to decide 
which rule to disregard and which one to implement in its 
place.
To measure the latency caused by the cognitive conflict 
that had to be overcome, the reaction time (RT) interference 
for the NEXT- and the GO-phase were computed separately 
by calculating the difference in mean RTs between incom-
patible and compatible trials for each phase. To deal with RT 
outliers, we applied the median absolute deviation method 
(see Leys et al., 2013) to RTs separately for each condition 
Fig. 2  A “target” response is 
required to an X-probe only 
when it follows an A-cue by 
pressing a specific button. Non-
target responses are made after 
all other types (A-Y, B-X, and 
B-Y) by pressing a different but-
ton. The first two stimuli in the 
depicted sequence represent a 
“target” A–X trial; the third and 
fourth stimuli together represent 
a “non-target” A-Y trial; “non-

















of each factor and participant. The NEXT-paradigm offers 
an elegant opportunity to distinguish between learned 
and instructed automaticity. Firstly, the difference in RTs 
between incompatible and compatible trials in the NEXT-
phase describes how a recently instructed response that is 
only applicable to the GO-phase interferes with the response 
required for NEXT-phase, the latter of which remains iden-
tical during the entire task and, thus, is executed repeat-
edly. Thus, it reflects a measure of instructed automaticity 
(Meiran et al., 2015). Secondly, the NEXT-paradigm offers 
another measure reflecting learned automaticity. Vice versa, 
the repeatedly executed NEXT-response might become a 
learned habitual tendency that interferes with the execution 
of the instructed stimulus–response pattern in the GO-phase. 
Therefore, the difference in RTs between incompatible and 
compatible trials in the GO-phase reflects the interference 
caused by the overlearned NEXT-response and, thus, repre-
sents a measure of learned automaticity.
As an additional performance measure, we employed the 
bin scoring method (see Hughes et al., 2014) by combining 
error rates with RTs. In incompatible GO-trials, the par-
ticipant had to give a response that differed from the previ-
ous trials. Due to the additional cognitive effort required to 
swap the dominant rule in incompatible trials, these usually 
result in longer RTs and a higher error rate. All participants’ 
RT differences between compatible and incompatible trials 
were collated, ordered into deciles (bins), and assigned a 
score between 1 (best/fastest 10% of trials) and 10 (worst/
slowest 10% of trials); incorrectly answered incompatible 
trials were assigned a penalty score of 20 regardless of their 
corresponding RT. Finally, each participant’s scores were 
summed to form a single bin score, representing their per-
formance in resolving the cognitive conflict. Participants did 
not commit any errors during the NEXT-phase of each trial; 
hence, there is no bins measure for overcoming instructed 
automaticity based on the NEXT-phase, but only for the 
measure of learned automaticity based on the GO-phase.
Results
Convergence and Divergence in the Measures 
of Automaticity in the NEXT‑Paradigm
The measures of RT interference for overcoming each type 
of automaticity in the NEXT-paradigm bore no correlation 
with each other, r = 0.025, p = 0.833. This finding indicates 
the distinctness of either type of automaticity and suggests 
the absence of a trade-off in being proficient in overcom-
ing either one. Furthermore, the measures on overcom-
ing learned automaticity of the DPX validate those of the 
NEXT-paradigm: Sensitivity in the DPX (A-cue d’) was 
negatively related to both (negatively scored) measures 
of the GO-phase of the NEXT-paradigm, namely the RT 
interference (r =  − 0.42, p < 0.001) and the bins (r =  − 0.25, 
p = 0.031), whereas c-bias was positively related to both the 
RT interference (r = 0.29, p = 0.013) and the bins (r = 0.41, 
p < 0.001). Therefore, the RT interference between incom-
patible and compatible trials during the GO-phase of the 
Y                    X X Y ... Y X
Time 
Go instructions NEXT phase: 0–5 trials
GO phase: 2 trials
NEXT instructions
GO instructions
Fig. 3  First, participants received instructions on how to respond dur-
ing the GO-phase of the upcoming block. Second, during the NEXT-
phase indicated through red stimuli, they are required to advance the 
screen using the NEXT-key. When green stimuli appear, participants 
are required to implement the instructions received at the beginning 
of the trial instead of pressing the NEXT-key. The correct responses 
are framed with a dashed line. The correct response during the 
NEXT-phase may differ from the initially instructed GO-response; 
similarly, the correct response during the GO-phase may differ from 
the habitual NEXT-response. Those situations, indicated with a flash, 
are incompatible trials, and the others are compatible trials
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NEXT-paradigm does indeed capture the participants’ apti-
tude at overcoming learned automaticity.
Overcoming Learned Automaticity in the Dot 
Pattern Expectancy Paradigm
The participants trained in OM meditation performed best 
at overcoming learned automaticity in the DPX as meas-
ured through d’ (M = 3.76, SD = 0.70), followed by the 
groups that were trained in  FAin (M = 3.61, SD = 0.68), 
 FAex (M = 3.42, SD = 0.70), and the control group (M = 3.22, 
SD = 0.45). A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed that the effect of the variation in training on sen-
sitivity reached almost significant levels, F(3, 69) = 2.43, 
p = 0.073, ηp2 = 0.096. Planned contrasts indicated a signifi-
cant small difference in performance between the medita-
tion groups and the control group, t(69) = 2.21, p = 0.031, 
r = 0.26. Looking at the differences between the meditation 
groups, there were no significant differences neither between 
the OM and FA groups (t(69) = 1.29, p = 0.201, r = 0.15) 
nor between the  FAin and the  FAex group (t(69) = 0.93, 
p = 0.356, r = 0.11). Furthermore, the group trained in OM 
meditation was most likely to respond negatively to trials as 
measured through c-bias (M = 0.43, SD = 0.20), followed by 
the groups that were trained in  FAin (M = 0.56, SD = 0.21), 
 FAex (M = 0.63, SD = 0.20), and the control group (M = 0.77, 
SD = 0.21). There was a significant large effect of the vari-
ation in training on c-bias (F(3,  69) = 8.92, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.280). Further investigation using planned contrasts 
revealed a significant medium-sized difference between 
the meditation groups and the control group (t(69) = 4.33, 
p < 0.001, r = 0.46). Comparing the meditation groups, there 
was a medium-size effect indicating that the participants in 
the group trained in OM meditation were significantly more 
likely to respond negatively to trials than those in the FA 
condition (t(69) = 2.75, p = 0.008, r = 0.31). The differences 
between  FAin and  FAex were not significant (t(69) = 1.00, 
p = 0.321, r = 0.12).
These results on overcoming learned automaticity in the 
DPX-paradigm as visualized in Fig. 4 indicate that the train-
ing in meditation may have made the subjects more alert 
toward questioning the present stimulus instead of blindly 
responding positively due to the overrepresentation of 
positive trials. Meditators performed better in overcoming 
learned automaticity than the control group, lending support 
to our first hypothesis. Furthermore, while OM meditation 
did not increase their performance to a greater extent than 
FA meditation, it made them maintain a more questioning 
attitude toward their automated behavioral patterns, resulting 
in a higher rate of negative responses.
Overcoming Learned Automaticity 
in the NEXT‑Paradigm
The participants trained in OM meditation had the lowest RT 
interference during the GO-phase (M =  − 11.1, SD = 15.0). 
Surprisingly, they responded faster to incompatible trials 
than they did to compatible ones. The OM group was fol-
lowed by the group trained in  FAin (M = 8.9, SD = 22.8), the 
control group (M = 12.7, SD = 15.9), and the group trained in 
 FAex (M = 18.2, SD = 25.8). A univariate ANOVA revealed 
a significant large main effect of meditation group alloca-
tion on RT interference (F(3, 69) = 6.80, p < 0.001, and 
ηp2 = 0.228). Planned contrasts indicated no significant dif-
ference between the meditation groups and the control group 
(t(69) = 1.56, p = 0.126, r = 0.24). Interestingly, a post hoc 
test using Fisher’s LSD revealed that the control group dif-
fers significantly and largely from the OM group (p = 0.001, 
d = 1.530). Differentiating between the meditation groups, 
the group trained in OM performed significantly and largely 
Fig. 4  Overview of the results 
on performance (A) and 
response bias (B) in the DPX. 
Error bars represent one stand-
ard error of the mean. Effect 
strengths obtained through 
planned contrasts are superim-
posed below the graph. Aster-
isks indicate significant results: 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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better than the FA groups (t(69) = 4.55, p < 0.001, r = 0.56). 
The differences between  FAin and  FAex were not significant 
(t(34.840) = 1.16, p = 0.256, r = 0.19).
Furthermore, adding error rates to the equation to com-
pute bin scores, the participants trained in OM medita-
tion performed best (M = 679, SD = 157), followed by the 
groups that were trained in  FAin (M = 761, SD = 181), then 
 FAex (M = 881, SD = 194), and the control group (M = 929, 
SD = 183). There was a significant large effect of the varia-
tion in training on the bin score (F(3, 69) = 7.19, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.238). Employing planned contrasts, there was a 
significant medium-sized difference between the medita-
tion groups and the control group (t(69) = 3.24, p = 0.002, 
r = 0.36). Between the meditation groups, the OM group and 
the FA groups differed largely from each other (t(69) = 2.70, 
p = 0.009, r = 0.31). Furthermore, there was a medium-sized 
difference between the  FAin and the  FAex group (t(69) = 2.03, 
p = 0.046, r = 0.24).
Taken together, the findings on overcoming learned auto-
maticity in the NEXT-paradigm as visualized in Fig. 5 fur-
ther substantiate our first hypothesis: meditation, regardless 
of technique, has benefited participants’ ability to overcome 
learned automaticity. Furthermore, OM practice was particu-
larly beneficial compared to FA practice in this task only, 
lending indicative support to our second hypothesis.
Overcoming Instructed Automaticity 
in the NEXT‑Paradigm
The group trained in  FAex showed the greatest performance 
in overcoming instructed automaticity as represented by 
the RT interference during the NEXT-phase of the epon-
ymous task (M = 2.8, SD = 12.2), followed by the con-
trol group (M = 4.2, SD = 12.5), the group trained in OM 
(M = 7.3, SD = 9.0), and, lastly, the group trained in FAin 
(M = 10.4, SD = 18.1). A univariate ANOVA revealed no 
significant effect of meditation style on RT interference 
(F(3, 69) = 1.16, p = 0.330, ηp2 = 0.048). Further explora-
tive computation of planned contrasts also yielded no 
significant results when comparing the meditation groups 
versus the control group (t(69) = 0.73, p = 0.465, r = 0.09). 
Furthermore, there were no significant differences between 
the meditation groups, neither comparing the OM group 
to the two FA groups (t(69) = 0.18, p = 0.855, r = 0.02) nor 
comparing the FAin group to the FAex group (t(69) = 1.71, 
p = 0.091, r = 0.20). Explorative post hoc pairwise compar-
isons using Fisher’s LSD did not reach significant levels 
either (ps = 0.091–0.502).
The findings on overcoming instructed automaticity in the 
NEXT-paradigm as visualized in Fig. 6 are contrary to our 
first hypothesis: there was no impact of meditation, regard-
less of technique, on overcoming instructed automaticity. 
They further highlight the notion of automaticity as a mul-
tifaceted construct (Stahl et al., 2014).
Discussion
Situations solved by automatic responses are widespread, 
representing a ready example of the Janus-faced nature of 
automaticity: it allows individuals to operate efficiently 
amidst consistent demands, but also bears the potential for 
errors if demands suddenly change. Consequently, empow-
ering individuals to evaluate the appropriateness of their 
automatisms in light of each situation’s peculiar demands 
and to decide on the most suitable action can serve to pre-
vent adversity. We hypothesized, first, that meditation train-
ing, regardless of technique, improves overcoming automa-
ticity; and, second, that training in OM does so to a greater 
extent than training in FA.
The intervention improved participants’ performance 
in overcoming learned automaticity across two tasks, 
Fig. 5  Overview of the results 
on overcoming learned automa-
ticity in the NEXT-paradigm 
assessed through reaction time 
interference (in [ms]) (A) and 
bins (B). Error bars represent 
one standard error of the mean. 
Effect strengths obtained 
through planned contrasts are 
superimposed below the graph. 
Asterisks indicate significant 




supporting our first hypothesis. However, their perfor-
mance in overcoming instructed automaticity remained 
unaffected. Further, meditation training has made par-
ticipants respond more conservatively in one task: 
They inhibited their overlearned response more often 
than non-meditators, indicating that they took a more 
questioning stance toward the appropriateness of their 
habit. This finding held true even for situations where 
the automated response would have been correct, and it 
is more pronounced for the group trained in OM rather 
than FA. Finally, comparing the groups regarding their 
performance in overcoming learned automaticity yielded 
ambiguous results: while the groups did not differ in one 
of two tasks, OM practitioners performed better than FA 
practitioners in the other one.
Meditation training has supported the participants’ 
ability to overcome erroneous automatic responses in rou-
tinized situations that have been executed frequently, but 
not in novel ones where the adequate action has merely 
been explained instead of practiced. In this regard, OM 
meditation may be a more promising practice than FA, 
but further research is needed to substantiate this notion.
Effects of Meditation on Overcoming Different Types 
of Automaticity
During meditation, regardless of technique, practitioners 
continually recognize, inhibit, and let go of distractions that 
interfere with their practice (Lutz et al., 2008). This sug-
gests that meditation practice may be universally suitable 
for preventing arising action tendencies from becoming 
dominant over alternative responses. However, the distrac-
tions that arise during meditation stem from information 
stored in long-term memory (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2018; 
Ellamil et al., 2016), rather than from earlier instructions 
that are actively represented in working memory (Cole et al., 
2017). Analogously, in learned automaticity, the overlearned 
automated response is stored in long-term memory, whereas 
instructed automaticity relies on the instructions being held 
in working memory instead. Furthermore, automaticity is 
a multifaceted construct comprised of, among others, the 
inhibition of an ongoing response (reactive stopping; e.g., 
Cai et al., 2011), and preparations to selectively stop an 
arising response tendency (response selection, or selective 
proactive stopping; Aron, 2011; Stahl et al., 2014). The 
ability to stop an ongoing response can support overcom-
ing learned automaticity, while the ability to stop an aris-
ing response tendency can support overcoming instructed 
automaticity. Notably, meditation practice has been found 
to improve behavioral inhibition but not response selection 
when different response options compete (Greenberg et al., 
2013). Taken together, practice in meditation may resem-
ble situations of learned automaticity more closely than it 
does situations of instructed automaticity. The distractions 
encountered in meditation possess properties comparable to 
overlearned action tendencies, and both can be disengaged 
from using similar cognitive operations. In turn, medita-
tion training can reduce one’s likelihood of falling victim 
to erroneous habitual responding stemming from repeated 
execution.
Differences Between Meditation Techniques
The divergence in outcomes between techniques may be 
due to different mental operations that are trained in either 
technique (e.g., Lutz et al., 2008). Although the require-
ment to avoid engaging in distracting thoughts is common 
for both techniques, they differ in their approach. More spe-
cifically, FA practitioners train to stop every distraction as 
soon as they recognize it and refocus their attention on their 
intended object. By contrast, OM practitioners do not focus 
on any object, but rather observe the upcoming impulse and 
their response to it. When a thought emerges, they restrain 
their natural tendency to expand on it (Desbordes et al., 
2015). Therefore, OM practitioners train to not engage with 
unwanted impulses and to not let them expand to dominate 
Fig. 6  Overview of the results on overcoming instructed automaticity 
in the NEXT-paradigm assessed through reaction time interference 
(in [ms]). Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. Effect 
strengths obtained through planned contrasts are superimposed below 
the graph, though none are statistically significant
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other sensations; instead, they clearly aim to notice the con-
tent and quality of the impulse from an observer’s perspec-
tive without attachment. Thus, when OM practitioners are 
confronted with a cognitive conflict, their improved monitor-
ing ability should make them less prone to allow a repeat-
edly executed response to dominate other options and to 
select the appropriate response in its place.
Limitations and Future Research
The present study provides compelling findings, but it is not 
without limitations. First, while the experimental design at 
hand displays high internal validity, it is unclear how well 
the results translate to real-world situations in which a person 
has to make a decision in the face of automaticity. Second, 
positive beliefs about training may affect its outcomes (Tsai 
et al., 2018). Recruiting an active control group that performs 
a sham training instead of the wait list control group may be 
a possible mitigation strategy. Third, the dose of this inter-
vention was similar to established literature on discerning 
the effects of meditation compared to a control group and 
sufficient in doing so. However, the results on distinguishable 
effects of different meditation techniques are indicative but 
not yet conclusive. Since both OM and FA meditations over-
lap partially in their utilization of cognitive mechanisms with 
the cognitive differences between the techniques being subtle 
and nuanced, their outcomes may only diverge after a longer 
period of training. Thus, future research may utilize a larger 
dose to elucidate this promising avenue. Fourth, this study 
considered neither reason for a dropout nor participants’ 
motivation and their expectations (e.g., relaxation, cognitive 
enhancement, knowledge of traditional literature, ethical 
aspirations). For example, Jensen et al. (2012) demonstrated 
a significant, motivation-related influence on the task perfor-
mance of meditators. Future work should take into account 
both the reasons for quitting training ahead of schedule and 
the basic motivation for meditation. This would allow testing 
for specific relations between both. Lastly, the conceptual-
ization of OM meditation as non-judgemental awareness of 
present-moment experiences does not incorporate an ethical 
dimension, which is important in the traditional technique 
(Ditrich, 2017; Monteiro et al., 2015; Nilsson & Kazemi, 
2016). While this “narrow” conceptualization—found in 
most existing research—is derived from Buddhist mindful-
ness, it should not be mistaken to represent it in its entirety.
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